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Article 
Judicial Vigilantism: Inherent Judicial 
Authority to Appoint Contempt 
Prosecutors in Young v. United States 
ex rei Vuitton Et Fils S.A. 
BY NEAL DEVINS* 
AND STEVEN J MULROY** 
INTRODUCTION 
Inherent executive authonty and the separation of powers 
have been Issues at the forefront of Supreme Court rulings these 
past few years.1 Flagship cases such as Immzgration and Natu-
ralization Servzce v Chadha,2 Bowsher v Synar,3 and Morrzson 
v 0/sorf have ruled on such monumentous Issues as the "leg-
Islative veto," the delegatiOn of budget-cuttmg authonty to the 
Comptroller General, and the appomtment of special counsel to 
* ASSistant Professor of Law and Research Fellow, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, 
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. B.A., Georgetown 
Umversity, 1978; J.D., Vanderbilt Umversity, 1982. 
** Law Clerk to Honorable Roger S. Vinson, U.S. Distnct Court for the Northern 
Distnct of Flonda (begmrung summer 1989). B.A., Cornell Uruversity, 1986; J.D. 
candidate, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. The authors 
would like to thank John Garvey for hts useful comments and Ashley Kiesel for her 
encouragement. 
• See generally Miller, Independent Agenczes, 1986 SUP Cr. REv 41; Rabkm & 
Devms, Averting Government by Consent Decree: Constitutional Lzmits on the Enforce-
ment of Settlements with the Federal Government, 40 STAN. L. REv 203 (1987); Verkuil, 
The Status of Independent Agenczes After Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE L.J. 779. 
2 462 u.s. 919 (1983). 
3 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986). 
• 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). 
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Investigate and prosecute charges of cnmmal wrongdomg by 
government officials. Among these sequmas of constitutiOnal 
law, the Supreme Court qmetly resolved a conflict that pitted 
executive prosecutonal discretiOn agamst the JUdiciary's Inherent 
power to vmdicate Its own authonty Ansmg m a trademark 
Infnngement case, the Court ruled m Young v Umted States ex 
rei Vuztton Et Fils S.A. 5 that federal courts have Inherent power 
to appomt pnvate counsel to prosecute an alleged contemnor 
for violation of a court order 6 
Only Justice Scalia took Issue wtth this aspect of the Court's 
holding.7 Charactenzmg the maJority's mherent power argument 
as mconsistent with the JUdiciary's passtve role, Justice Scalia 
s 107 S. Ct. 2124 (1987). 
6 Because our concern 1s this aspect of the Court's ruling, this Article will not 
address court authority 10 "direct" contempt. Direct contempt 1s distinct from "indirect" 
10 that the former takes place within the court's presence. See 8 FED. R. CruM. P 42(a); 
8B J. MooRE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE f 42.02[3) (2d ed. 1987), Direct contempt 
generally 10volves the disruption of courtroom proceedings, yet mdirect contempt IS the 
out-of-court VIOlation of a court order. Because direct contempt proceedings are sum-
mary, court appo10tment of a prosecutor 1s unnecessary and the JUdicial appo10tment 
power 1s not Implicated. Summary procedure, however, still giVes the JUdiciary authority 
to mitiate prosecution. 
Separation of powers problems are not reused by "direct" contempt. The Immediate 
need to quell court disruption JUStifies the limited ability of the JUdiciary to "initiate 
prosecution" for direct contempt. In fact, Justice Scalia recogmzed that each branch of 
government "must each possess those powers necessary to protect the functiomng of its 
own processes.'' Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2145 (Scalia, J., concumng). Consequently, 
Young does not call 10to question "direct contempt" prosecutions agcunst those who 
10terfere with the orderly conduct of JUdicial proceedings. 
This Article, moreover, IS concerned solely with cnmmal contempt. Cnmmal con-
tempt differs from ctvil contempt both 10 purpose and execution. Cnmmal contempt ts 
punitive 10 nature. Cnmmal contempt sentences are for definite penods of time because 
the goal1s deterrence of future violations. Civil contempt Is remedial m nature; sentences 
may last only as long as the tnal 10volved but are 10determmate, because the obJect IS 
to force the contemnor to comply with a court's order. Once the civil contemnor 
complies, the penalty IS removed. J. MooRE, supra, at f 42.02[2]. Jailing a recalcitrant 
witness until he testifies IS an example of ctvil contempt. Impnsomng someone who once 
vtolated an mjunction for two years IS an example of cnmmal contempt. 
7 Justice Scalia agreed with the Young majority that the distnct court committed 
error when it sought to excuse the enforcement of the ongmal order by appomting the 
plcuntiff's attorney m the underlymg trademark suit. This appomtment of an mterested 
party created a conflict of mterest undenrumng the contempt prosecution. See Young, 
107 S. Ct. at 2135-38. Justices Powell, O'Connor, White, and Chief Justice Rehnqu1st, 
however, mdicated that the maJority erred m assuming that plruntiff's counsel could not 
serve as a dismterested prosecutor. /d. at 2147-48 (Powell, Rehnqutst, & O'Connor, 
J.J., concumng 10 part and dissenting m part); 1d. at 2148 (White, J., dissenting). 
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asserted that the enforcement of court orders Is a task reserved 
to the executive.8 In our view~ Justice Scalia IS nght. Because of 
the traditionally Jealous reservation of prosecutonal discretiOn 
to the executive and the similanty between cnmmal contempts 
and regular cnmes, the Young ma]onty's "necessity" ratiOnale 
does not overnde valid separation of powers concerns. 
This Article will be divided mto three sections. SectiOn I will 
set out the conflict resolved m Young-contrastmg the court's 
cnmmal contempt power with traditiOnal prosecutonal discre-
tion. Sections II and III will consider possible JUstifications for 
this divergence. Section II will consider whether contempts are 
mnately different from cnmes In a way that reduces separation 
of powers concerns. Section III will address the possibility that 
the JUdicial branch has a uruque, mherent, and overnding need 
for a power of self-vmdicat10n. It Is our conclusiOn that neither 
of these ratiOnales support the abandonment of traditional pros-
ecutonal discretiOn. 
I. CRIMINAL CoNTEMPT AND THE SEPARATION OF PoWERS 
The Supreme Court has long held that the JUdiciary has an 
mherent power to purush contempts.9 This power has been con-
strued by lower courts to Imply an authonty to mitlate proceed-
mgs, which m turn supports JUdicial appomtment of prosecutors.10 
• An analogous controversy has recently emerged with respect to the c1vil contempt 
power of bankruptcy JUdges. See Feder & Feder, Judges• Disputed Contempt Power 
Supported by High Court Rulings, NAT'L L.J., April 25, 1988, at 26-29. 
9 See, e.g., Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958); Michaelson v. United 
States ex ref. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42 (1924); Gompers v. Bucks 
Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 4I8 (1911); United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (I906); 
Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1988); Ex parte Robmson, 86 U.S. 505 (1873); Anderson 
v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821). 
10 See, e.g., In re Brown, 454 F.2d 999 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Conole, 
365 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. demed, 385 U.S. 1025 (1967); In re Fletcher, 216 F.2d 
915, 917 {4th Cir. 1954), cert. demed, 348 U.S. 931 (1955); Uruted States ex ref. Brown 
v. Lederer, 140 F.2d 136, 138 (7th Cir.), cert. demed, 322 U.S. 734 {1944); Western 
Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Gotfned, 136 F.2d 98, 100-01 {9th Cir. 1943); O'Malley v. United 
States, 128 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1942), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. Pendergast v. 
United States, 317 U.S. 412 (1943); McCann v. New York Stock Exch., 80 F.2d 211 (2d 
Cir. 1935), cert. demed, 299 U.S. 603 (1936). See generally Recent Developments, 
Crzmma/ Contempt: Federal Courts Power to DismiSS Proceeding Before Tnal, 66 
CoLtJM. L. REv 182 (1966). 
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While the Supreme Court has recogmzed that Congress may 
regulate this power, 11 the Court has never suggested that the 
legislature may abrogate It.12 Indeed, both the majonty and 
Justice Scalia agreed m Young v Umted States ex rei Vuitton 
Et Fils S.A. 13 that perceived mherent JUdicial authority underlies 
the Federal Rules of Cnmmal Procedure,s14 assumptiOn that a 
JUdge may appOint pnvate counsel to prosecute an Indirect con-
tempt.15 The fact that a United States Attorney had previously 
declined to prosecute the alleged contemnor Is Irrelevant to this 
formulatton. 16 
11 See Bloom v. Illino1s, 391 U.S. 194, 196 n.I (1968); Michaelson, 266 U.S. at 
65-67. 
12 In Michaelson, the Court recogruzed that Congress could prohibit Court mitiated 
contempt "where the act or thmg constituting the contempt IS also a cnme m the 
ordinary sense." Michaelson, 266 U.S. at 66. Michaelson, however, emphasized that thls 
legislative restnction m 18 U.S.C. § 401 did not question federal court authority to 
pumsh a person for disruptive behavior m the courts' presence, for official rmsbehav10r 
by a court officer, or for disobedience of a lawful order. In subsequent declSlons, the 
Supreme Court has likew1se held that, despite the courts' mherent power, § 401 1mposes 
bmding limits on court authority. See Bloom, 391 U.S. at 203 (§ 401 "narrowly 
confined" the contempt authority); In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943) (section's prohl-
bition agamst both fine and 1mpnsonment IS bmding on all courts); Nye v. United 
States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941) (courts' mherent contempt power IS limited to purushlng 
conduct proscribed by § 401). 
13 
.See 107 S. Ct. 2124, 2130 (1987); 1d. at 2142 n.10 (Scalia, J., concumng). A 
congressional attempt to authonze this appomtment authority would rruse Issues Identical 
to the ongomg controversy over federal appomtments of mdependent counsel under the 
Eth1cs m Government Act. In fact, MorriSon distingUished Young precisely on these 
grounds. See mfra notes 143-57 and accompanymg text. 
14 The Federal Rules of Cnmmal Procedure are promulgated by the Supreme 
Court. They become Jaw unless Congress rejects them withm 90 days. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 
(1982). 
ts Federal Rule of Cnmmal Procedure 42 sets out the procedure for prosecution 
of a cnmmal contempt. Section (a) prov1des for summary disposition of direct contempt, 
and Section (b) provides for notice and heanng for mdirect contempt. Section (b) requrres 
notice to take the form of a judge's oral announcement, or, "on application of the 
United States attorney or of an attorney appomted by the court for that purpose," an 
order to show cause. FED. R. CRIM. P 42(b) (1982) (emphasis added). See generally 
Note, Pnvate Prosecutors m Cnmmal Contempt Actions Under Rule 42(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Cnmmal Procedure, 54 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1141 (1986). 
16 In Young, the plamtiff's counsel, at the distnct court's suggestion, had contacted 
the United States Attorney's Office. The Cnmmal DiviSion Chlef, however, expressed 
no mterest beyond Wishmg rum luck. Young, 107 s. Ct. at 2129. The Young majority 
disapproved of thls approach, suggesting that "[judicial] restramt" suggests that a court 
"ordinarily" should seek assistance from the "appropnate prosecuting authority." /d. 
at 2134. At the same time, Young clearly recogruzes that a pnvate prosecutor may be 
appomted if that request IS demed. Id. 
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Judicial cnmmal contempt power IS on the surface at odds 
With traditional prosecutonal discretion. The Supreme Court has 
contmued to emphasize the constitutiOnal grounding of executive 
discretion In law enforcement. In Umted States v Nixon, 17 the 
Court msisted that the executive· branch retams "absolute dis-
cretiOn to decide whether to prosecute a case, " 18 Citing earlier 
decisions tracmg prosecutonal discretiOn to "the constitutiOnal 
separation of powers."19 Indeed, In the Confiscation Cases, the 
Court flatly stated that public prosecutions are "within the 
excluszve direction of the distnct attorney " 20 Only evidence of 
flagrant bias or discnffilnatiOn m the pattern of prosecution 
seems to JUstify JUdicial review of decisions not to prosecute. 21 
Moreover, only those prosecuted or threatened with prosecutiOn 
could file such clrums because ''in Amen can JUrisprudence at 
least, a pnvate Citizen lacks a Judicially cogrnzable mterest m 
the prosecution or nonprosecut10n of another. " 22 
Just as pnvate litigants cannot force prosecutions to occur, 
lower federal courts have also ruled that Congress has no valid 
17 418 u.s. 683 (1974). 
11 Id. at 693 (citing Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454 (1868)). 
19 United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. demed sub. nom. 
Cox v. Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935 (1965). Thus, "[i]t follows, as an mczdent to the 
constitutional separation of powers, that the courts are not to mterjere with the free 
exerctse of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States m therr control 
over cnmmal prosecutions." Id. at 171 (emphasis added); see Umted States v. Kilpatnck, 
821 F.2d 1456, 1463 (lOth Cir. 1987) (a Judge may not even add by Implication an 
essential element to an mdictment), cert. demed, 108 S. Ct. 699 (1988); Community for 
Creative NonVIolence v. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("[t]he power to 
dectde when to mvestigate, and when to prosecute, lies at the core of the Executive's 
duty to see to the faithful execution of the laws"). 
20 Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457 (1868) (emphasts added). 
21 In general, "the conscious exerctse of some selectivity m enforcement ts not m 
itself a federal constitutional VIOlation." Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). But 
JUdicial revtew Is available when a litigant shows that a prosecutor has discnmmated on 
the basts of "race, relig10n, or other arbitrary classification," zd., or when a prosecutor 
vmdictively exerctses hts discretion for "retaliatory use." Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 
27. 30 (1984). 
Judictal reVIew can also become available when an executive officer refuses to 
perform a purely mtmstenal duty. Kendal v. United States ex ref. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 
Pet.) 524 (1838). Mimstenal duty IS defined as "one m respect to whtch nothmg ts left 
to discretion." National Treasury Employees Uruon v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 607-08 
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (quoting Misstsstppt v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 498 (1867)). 
21 Lmda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); see Leeke v. Timmerman, 
454 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1981) (per cunam), reh'g demed, 454 U.S. 1165 (1982). 
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mterest "in having laws executed properly. " 23 Unlike pnvate 
litigants, Congress can mfluence enforcement discretion through 
the enactment and modificatiOn of statutes. Nevertheless, some 
room for executive JUdgment and discretion regarding Issues such 
as the sufficiency of evidence, the availability of alternative 
enforcement mechamsms, and the competmg clrums of other 
cases on enforcement resources will generally remrun.24 
The Supreme Court's 1985 decision In Heckler v. Chaney25 
exemplifies these concerns. Concluding that the Food and Drug 
Admm1strat10n presumptively has Irreversible discretiOn to de-
cline to challenge the safety and efficacy of particular drugs, the 
Court In Chaney did not hesitate to draw the parallel between 
these aspects of adm!mstrative discretiOn: 
An [adnurustrative or regulatory] agency's refusal to mstitute 
proceedings shares to some extent the charactenstics of the 
deciSion of a prosecutor m the Executive Branch not to mdict-
a deciSion whtch has long been regarded as the special provmce 
of the Executtve Branch, masmuch as it 1s the Executive who 
Is charged by the Constitution ''to take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed.' ' 26 
2.! Amencan Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303, 305 (D.C. Cir. 
1982); see Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 815, 888 (3d 
Cir. 1986) (Congress' interest m enforcmg a constitutional law 1s ''no more than that of 
the average ciuzen"), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1218 (1988); Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 
21, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., dissenting), cert. granted, sub nom., Burke v. Barnes, 
475 U.S. 1044 (1986), JUdgment vacated, 419 U.S. 361 (1987). The Distnct of Columbia 
Circuit, however, has srud that Congress has an mterest m "the prbcess by which a bill 
becomes law" and thus could sue over executive vote "nullification." Moore v. United 
States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. demed, 469 
U.S. 1106 (1985); see Pierce, 691 F.2d at 305. The Third Circuit, however, allows the 
House or Senate to mtervene m cases where the executive either declines to defend a 
statute or declares it unconstitutional. Ameron, Inc., 787 F.2d at 888 n.8. For commen-
tary, see McGowan, Congressmen m Court: The New Plamtiffs, 15 GA. L. REv 241 
(1981) (argumg for prudential doctrme of equitable discretion); Case Comment, Moore 
v. House of Representatives: A Possible Expans1on of Congressmen's Standing to Sue, 
60 NoTRE DAME L. REv 417 (1985) (argumg for derual of standing on constitutional 
grounds). 
2A One apparent exception 1s the Ethics m Government Act provJstons for the 
appomtment of spec1al counselm place of Justice Department officlals. See mfra notes 
143-57 and accompanymg text. 
lS 470 u.s. 821 (1985). 
26 Id. at 832 (citation omitted). Commentators have debated the ultimate prece-
dential SJgnitlcance of Chaney. Compare Sunstem, Rev1ewmg Agency Inaction After 
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The Court further noted that an agency generally Is ''far better 
eqmpped than the courts to deal With the many variables m-
volved m the proper ordermg of Its pnorities."27 Applymg this 
logic to federal crunmal prosecutions, one would Imagme that 
the Department of Justice IS the office m government best 
eqmpped to determme which actions will best further the rule 
of law 
Recent Supreme Court decisions on separation of powers 
also reenforce the propnety of leavmg prosecutonal discretion 
matters m the executive's hands. The Court has stated that "[t]he 
Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new 
Federal Government mto three defined categones, Legislative, 
Executive, and Judicial"28 and "this system of division and 
separation of powers was deliberately so structured to assure 
full, VIgorous and open debate on the great Issues affectmg the 
people and to proVIde avenues for the operation of checks on 
the exercise of governmental power."29 Plrunly, both the consti-
tutional emphasis on tnpartite division of the federal government 
and the delicate balance It creates would be senously undermmed 
by arrangements blurnng the line between executive and JUdicial 
powers. At the very least, the assumption of executive functions 
by the JUdiciary obscures the parameters of executive discretiOn 
In the Implementation of the laws, 
Young runs contrary to the growmg recognitiOn of the m-
VIOlability of executive enforcement discretion. Young demon-
strates that the JUdicial branch has an mterest, not only m 
general enforcement of court orders, but also m directmg pros-
ecution m mdiVldua/ cases. What JUstifies such an aberration 
from traditional notions of prosecutonal discretlon?30 There are 
Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 653 (1985) (suggesting possible availability of 
Implied nghts of action and other devices to secure JUdiCial review of agency maction) 
with Rabkm & Devms, supra note 1, at 238-39 (Chan~y conforms to agency recognition 
of propnety of executive enforcement discretion). Whatever its precedential significance, 
Chaney clearly mvokes prosecutonal discretion as a shibboleth of mherent executive 
prerogatives. 
v Chaney, 410 U.S. at 831-32. 
21 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
29 Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3187 (1986). 
:Ill Troubled by Similar concerns, some circuit court cases have questioned the 
authonzation of court-appomted pnvate prosecutors under Rule 42(b) pnor to the Young 
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two possible answers: either contempts are Innately different 
from cnmes m a way that reduces separatiOn of powers concerns, 
or the JUdicial branch has a umque, mherent, and overnding 
need for a power of self-vmdicat10n. Each of these answers will 
be exammed m tum. 
II. CONTEMPT AS CRIME 
What are the attributes of a cnme? Is It the prospect of a 
cnmmal penalty? Is 1t the mandate of procedural safeguards to 
ensure the protectiOn of constitutiOnal nghts? Does It matter 
whether the purpose of the proceeding Is to vmdicate the au-
thonty of a branch of government rather than pumsh conduct 
the legislature prescribes as harmful? Is It sigmficant that the 
procedures are tnggered by noncompliance with a court order 
rather than noncompliance with a legislative mandate? 
The Supreme Court answered these questiOns m Young, 
either directly or by mference. In the Court's view, pnor hold-
mgs recogmzmg "cnmmal contempt as 'a cnme m the ordinary 
sense' " 31 are mconsequential to the determmation of whether 
''prosecution of contempt must now be considered an execution 
of the cnmmal law ''32 In other words, cnmmal penalties and 
concomitant procedural safeguards alone do not make a cnme. 
Instead, the Young Court emphasized that a cnmmal contempt 
Is not "conduct prescribed as harmful by the general cnmmal 
laws. " 33 It IS "conduct that violates specific dut1es Imposed by 
dectston. For example, the Fifth Circuit, m Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and 
Engmemen v. United States, 411 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated a contempt conviction 
where the prosecutor was the pnvate counsel for opposmg party m the underlymg action 
on the grounds that "the National Soveretgn, through its chosen officers, should be m 
control of cnmmal contempt proceedings." Id. at 319. The court remanded with the 
mstruction that "the Distnct Court, if it determmes that the prosecution should go 
forward, should designate the United States Attorney and hts Assistants." Id. at 320. 
The court did not address what would happen if the United States Attorney declined to 
prosecute. In a later case, it was argued that the Brotherhood decJston demanded that 
government attorneys prosecute cnmmal contempts. A dectston was unnecessary to a 
resolution of the case, however, and the court explicitly reserved the tssue. United States 
v. McKenZie, 735 F.2d 907, 910 n.ll (5th Cir. 1984). 
31 Young v. United States ex rei. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 107 S. Ct. 2124, 2133 (1987) 
(quoting Bloom v. Illinots, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968)). 
32 Id. 
3) Id. 
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the court Itself, arismg directly from the parties' participatiOn m 
JUdicial proceedings" and Its "fundamental purpose [therefore] 
Is to preserve respect for the JUdicial system Itself. " 34 Source, 
specificity, and purpose, under this formulatiOn, are cntical 
components to the deterrmnation of what constitutes a cnme. 
This formulatiOn IS unsatisfactory Upon closer exammat10n, 
source, specificity, and purpose seem Irrelevant to the questiOn 
of whether a JUdicial prosecutmg power Is somehow mandated 
by the separatiOn of powers. In addition, both the history and 
modern practice of contempt proceedings make any s1gmficant 
distinction from cnmmal proceedings untenable. 
A. History and Contemporary Practice 
Rather than rughlightmg differences, history and modern 
practice generally illustrate the Identity between "general cnmes" 
and mdirect cnrmnal contempt proceedings. Pnor to 1821,35 
English common law treated viOlatiOns of court orders m the 
same manner as normal cnmes.36 For example, Sir John Fox's 
semmal work on contempt shows no distmct10n m procedures 
utilized in contempt and cnmmal cases from 1253 to 1720.37 
l( Id. at 2134. 
35 In 1821, Wilmot's optruon became an authoritative part of English law. Rex v. 
Clement, I06 Eng. Rep. 918, 923 (1821); see mfra notes 38-41 and accompanymg text; 
see also Bloom, 391 U.S. 194, 198 n.2 (1968). 
36 See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 201-I3 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting); 
Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1914) (citing Solly-Flood, 3 Transactions 
of the Royal Histoncal Soctety, N.S. p. 147 (1885)); Beale, Contempt of Court, Cnmmal 
and Civil, 21 HAR.v L. REv. 161, 169-70, 174 (1907-08); Frankfurter & Landis, Power 
of Congress over Procedure m Cnmmal Contempts m "Infenor" Federal Courts-A 
Study m Separation of Powers, 31 HARv L. REv. 1010, 1042-52 (1924). See generally 
J. Fox, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT (1927). While these authorities are 
concerned with the summary nature of contempt proceedings, they nonetheless mamtam 
that contempt proceedings were generally Identical to ordinary cnmmal proceedings 
under the early common law. 
37 See J . Fox, supra note 36, at Appendix, 227-42; Frankfurter & Landis, supra 
note 36, at 1042, 1046. In Bloom v. Illin01s, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), the Supreme Court 
stmply may have found no basts for summary purushment of out-of-court contempt by 
a stranger to the proceedings. Id. at 198 n.2, 200. Although there IS language m Fox's 
treatise to that effect, the entirety of the work suggests otherw1se. For example, on the 
same page that he asserts that a contempt by a "stranger out of court was proceeded 
agamst like any other trespass," he also writes that no summary proceeding for "con-
tempts out of court" occurred before the seventeenth century. J. Fox, supra note 36, 
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The turrung pomt m the difference m treatment between 
cnme and contempt came wtth an erroneous and unreported 
King's Bench opiruon, The King v Almon, wntten by Judge 
Wilmot m 1765 38 Improperly relymg on the "immemonal us-
age'' of the common law, Wilmot-like the Supreme Court m 
Young-spoke of the courts' mherent power to use contempt 
proceedings as a means to vindicate JUdicial authority 39 Al-
though the opiruon misstated the common law, Blackstone, a 
fnend of Wilmot's, used the opmion m his Commentarres,40 
where it has ''bedevilled the law of contempt both In England 
and m this country ever smce.' '41 
Amencan respect for Blackstone's Commentanes "bore this 
Almon-phenomenon of England to the Uruted States, where it 
was early mculcated as a rule of law " 42 By the twentieth century, 
"the law of Wilmot had, like fine Wine, aged to the pmnt of 
unquestlorung respect.' '43 Early m this century, the Supreme 
Court charactenzed contempts as sm genens, not stnctly cnmmal 
m nature.44 
at 4. Furthermore, after summanzmg that strangers to the proceedings were purushed 
"in the ordinary course of Jaw," he notes that "parties to proceedings were governed 
by the rules wruch applied to strangers." /d. at 116. Finally, hls Appendix lists cases 
where resisters to the King's writ were tned m the ordinary manner. /d. at 227-42. 
Frankfurter and Landis, citing Fox but adding their own research, conclude that 
up to the "early part of the eighteenth century," con tempts committed by persons not 
"officially connected with the court" were "dealt with by the ordinary course of law," 
except where the offense occurred m the actual vtew of the court. Frankfurter & Landis, 
supra note 36, at 1042. For other works reachmg the same conclusion, see also Green, 
356 U.S. at 205-07 (Black, J., dissenting); Bloom, 233 U.S. at 610-11 (citing the work 
of the British commentator Sally-Flood); Beale, supra note 36, 169-70. 
38 Because of a procedural error, the proceeding had to be abandoned, and the 
court 1ssued no op1ruon. Wilmot, who bad already written hls opiruon by thls pomt, 
mcluded it m his memOirs. J. Fox, supra note 36, at 5-6. Fox critictzes the optmon as 
without foundation and contrary to the common law at the time. /d. at 4, 11-15. 
39 /d. at 7-8. 
40 Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 36, at 1047 n.128. 
41 Id. at 1047 Justice Black, m hts Green dissent, critictzed the case's "baleful 
mfluence on the law of contempt both m thts country and m England." Green, 356 
U.S. at 203 (Black, J., dissenting). 
41 R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 19 (1963). 
•3 Id • 
.. Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 103 (1924); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & 
Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 326 
(1904). 
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Remarkably, smce the Judiciary Act of 1789 and until the 
Young opm10n, the Supreme Court and Congress have Increas-
mgly returned to the ongmal common law moonngs by msistmg 
that cnmmal contempt be treated like other cnmes. 45 While the 
Court has never ruled that mdirect contempt IS mdistmgmshable 
from other cnmes, this shift In emphasis bespeaks the funda-
mental Identity between contempt and "general cnmes." 
Numerous Court decisions have equated contempts with gen-
eral cnmes.46 As stated by Justice Holmes: 
, 
These contempts are mfractions of the law, visited with pun-
Ishment as such. If such acts are not cnmmal, we are m error 
as to the most fundamental charactenstic of cnmes as that 
word has been understood m English speech. 47 
In fact, m Bloom v 11/inozs, the Court concluded that "the role 
of cnmmal contempt and that of many ordinary cnmmal laws 
seem Identical-protection of the mstltutions of our government 
and enforcement of their mandates. " 48 Finally, several Supreme 
Court rulings recogruze the especially strong need to provide 
procedural protections m contempt actions because contempt 
~' With respect to Congress, after dissatisfaction with JUdictal abuse under the 
1789 Judictary Act's unrestncted grant of contempt power, Congress restncted the 
contempt powers to "nusbehav10r 10 the presence of the court or so near thereto as to 
obstruct JUStice; mtsbehav10r of court officers m thetr offictal transactions; and disobe-
dience of or reststance to the lawful writ, process, order, or decree of the court." Bloom, 
391 U.S. at 202-03; see Green, 356 U.S. at 168-72. 
46 See Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2133 (" '[c]nnunal contempt 1s a cnme m the ordinary 
sense' ")(quoting Bloom, 391 U.S. at 201); Michaelson v. United States ex rei. Chtcago, 
St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924) ("[t]he fundamental charactenstics of both 
[cnmes and cnmmal contempts] are the same"); O'Neal v. United States, 190 U.S. 36, 
38 (1903) (an adjudication for contempt IS "in effect a Judgment m a cnnunal case"); 
New Orleans v. The Steamshtp Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 387, 392 (1874) ("[c]ontempt of 
court 1s a specific cnnunal offense") . 
• , Gompers, 233 U.S. at 610; see also Green, 356 U.S. at 201 (Black, J ., dissenting}: 
As it may now be purushed cnnunal contempt ts manifestly a cnme by 
every relevant test of reason or htstory. It possesses all the earmarks 
commonly attributed to a cnme. A mandate of the Government has alleg-
edly been v10lated for whtch severe purushment, mcluding long pnson 
sentences, may be exacted-purushment rumed at chastismg the v1olator 
for hts disobedience. 
•• Bloom, 391 U.S. at 201. 
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"strikes at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a JUdge's 
temperament.' ' 49 
Over the course of this century, the Supreme Court has srud 
that cnmmal contempt IS an "offense" for statute of limitatiOns 
purposes50 and the Constitution's pardon clause;51 that due pro-
cess reqmres a reasonable doubt standard and the self-mcnmi-
nation pnvilege;52 that accused contemners be given pnor notice, 
a heanng, defense counsel, and the opporturuty to present wit-
nesses;53 that courts adhere to the normal rules of evidence;54 
that the accused contemnor has a nght to a public tnal before 
an Impartial Judge55 and to confront and cross-examine wit-
nesses;56 and that the accused contemnor has a nght to a JUry 
tnal.57 Today, aside from the appomtments power recogruzed In 
Young, cnmmal proceedings differ from mdirect cnminal con-
tempt only m the need for grand JUry mdictments.58 Indeed, the 
49 Id. at 202; see Sacher v. Umted States, 343 U.S. 1, 12 (1952) (contempt 1s an 
offense agrunst a JUdge's "dignity and authority"), relz 'g demed, 343 U.S. 931 (1952); 
Locke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925) (contempt may mvolve personal attack 
on JUdge); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 (1888) (a contemnor msults a court's 
"dignity"). 
50 Gompers, 233 U.S. at 610-13. 
'
1 Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 89 (1925). 
'
2 Gompers, 221 U.S. at 418. 
'
3 Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925). 
$4 See generally Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385 (1957), reh'g demed, 353 
u.s. 931 (1957). 
'' Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954). 
'
6 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). 
" Bloom, 391 U.S. at 202. 
'
8 United States v. Nunn, 622 F.2d 802, 804 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. 
Bukowsla, 435 F.2d 1094, 1099-1102 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. demed, 401 U.S. 911 (1971). 
See Kuhns, Lrmiting the Cnmmal Contempt Power: New Roles for the Prosecutor and 
the Grand Jury, 73 MICH. L. REv 483, 492-93 (1974-75) (advocating that contempts be 
treated like cnmes m all respects). Because federal grand Junes are techmcally a part of 
the executive branch, the failure to convene a grand JUry JS cons1stent with court-Initiated 
contempt proceedings. For a recent discussiOn of federal grand JUnes, see Note, The 
Attorney-Client Pnvilege m Congresswnal Investigations, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 145 (1988). 
Two other mmor differences anse between cnmes and contempts. First, while 
VIolation of an mvalid statute IS not pumshable under cnmmallaw, VIolation of a court 
order Is cmmnal contempt regardless of the order's ·validity. Maness v. Meyers, 419 
U.S. 449, 458-59 (1975). Th1s procedural difference, however, hardly JUStifies a JUdicial 
contempt appomtment power. Because it affords court orders even more respect and 
efficacy under the law than the status that statutes enJOY, tt actually reduces the need 
for JUdicial self-enforcement. It thus makes a contempt appomtment power even less 
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Court m Young construed the contemporary practice to be to 
treat cnmmal contempt like other cnmes.59 Young, however, 
finds support for the JUdicial appomtments power. It pomts to 
the uruque source, specificity, and purpose of mdirect contempt, 
which distingmsh contempt from "general cnmes."60 Young also 
speaks of the essentially passive nature of JUdicial proceedings, 
which makes the contempt power "necessary" to the JUdiciary's 
ability to function as a coequal branch. 61 We shall first consider 
source, specificity, and purpose. 
B. Source, Specificzty, and Purpose 
SOURCE: It IS hard to fathom why the Young Court finds 
significant the fact that mdirect cnminal contempt Is tnggered 
by refusal to comply with a court order, rather than by legisla-
tively enacted cnmmal law 62 Because both types of malfeasance 
are subJect to cnmmal penalty, no Intmtlve reason eXIsts to clrum 
that a violatiOn of the cnmmal law IS a cnme whereas nonac-
qmesence to a valid court order IS a noncnme subject to cnmmal 
penalty In both cases, the court IS pumshmg cnmmally a breach 
of socially acceptable conduct. Common sense suggests that the 
pumshability of the breach defines the cnme, not the source of 
the norm that IS subject to pumshment upon violatiOn. Undoubt-
edly, one would be hard pressed to explrun to the cnmmal 
contemnor awrutmg sentencmg that his conduct was noncn-
mmal.63 
compelling. 
Second, JUdges have plenary discretion regarding dismissal of contempt prosecu-
tions: a federal JUdge may dismiss an otherwise valid contempt prosecution if she finds 
m her discretion that no public mterest would be served by continuation of the proceed-
mg. United States v. Barnett, 346 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1965). This power, of course, IS 
merely the other side of the Young power to Initiate mdirect contempt prosecutions. 
Our critique of Young IS therefore applicable to thts practice. 
59 Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2133 ("Our InSistence on the cnmmal character of contempt 
prosecutions has been mtended to rebut early charactenzations of such actions as 
undeserv:mg of the protections normally provtded :m cnmmal proceedings."). 
60 /d. at 2133-34; see mfra notes 62-72 and accompanymg text. 
61 Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2131-34; see mfra notes 73-79 and accompanymg text. 
61 Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2133 (distingmshmg contempt from "conduct proscribed 
as harmful by the general cnmmal laws"). 
63 This IS especially true m Young, where one of the contemners received a five 
year "nonsentence." /d. at 2128 n.l. 
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The source argument also falters because contempts are VIol-
atiOns of the general cnmmallaw. 18 U.S.C. sectiOn 401 makes 
"[d]isobedience or resistance to . . [a court's] lawful writ, 
process, order, rule, decree, or command" purushable by fine 
or Impnsonment.64 Although sectiOn 401 can be charactenzed as 
merely codification of an 1nherent JUdicial power, 65 It Is none-
theless a congressiOnal statute applicable to allmdiVIduals withm 
the JUrisdictiOn of the United States. Indeed, m Eloom v 1/li-
nors, 66 the Supreme Court charactenzed. this provision as "the 
basis for the general power to pumsh cnmmal contempt. " 67 
SPECIFICITY The Young Court's emphasis on the fact 
that-unlike other cnmmals-the cnmmal contemnor Hviolates 
specific duties Imposed by the court Itself' '68 can mean one of 
two things, neither of whxch JUstifies the conclusiOn that cnmmal 
contempt xs not a cnme. First, the Court might vtew a court 
order as distmct from a law of general applicability because it 
only binds the participants tn a JUdicial proceeding. With respect 
to those participants, however, the court order xs as much a 
legal mandate as any legislative provxs10n. Furthermore, legisla-
tive enactments do not truly apply to all; anti-pollution measures 
only affect those who might pollute, and the restrrunt of trade 
prohibition only affects those who might restrrun trade. Con-
tempt as a consequence of noncompliance with a court order 
therefore seems as much a rule of general applicability as the 
penalties associated with viOlations of environmental or antitrust 
laws. 
Second, the Court might consider cnmmal contempt as an 
mtemal bookkeepmg measure thereby not Implicating the broader 
concerns of legislatively enacted cnmmal law In fact, Young 
places sigmficant weight on the fact that a "parties' participation 
In JUdicial proceedings" IS a prereqUisite to an Indirect contempt 
prosecutiOn. 69 Th1s distmct10n IS unsatisfactory It restates the 
"source" argument, z.e., cnmmal contempt Is not a cnme be-
64 18 u.s.c. § 401 (1982). 
65 See supra note 9 and accompanymg text. 
66 391 u.s. 194 (1968). 
61 Id. at 203-04. 
68 Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2134, 
69 Id. 
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cause cnmes are a legislative statement of social mores. In other 
words, even If one views Indirect contempt as essentially an 
mternal matter, the availability of a cnminal penalty necessarily 
means that contempt-like other ctimes-Is a breach of socially 
acceptable conduct. 
Specificity concerns, moreover, extend beyond JUdicial ac-
tion. For example; admimstrative agencies make determmat10ns 
JUSt as specific as court orders, bmding on specific parties, and 
yet the agencies have no power to mstitute cnminal prosecutions 
for violations of their rulings. Young surely does not mtimate 
that they should be able to do so,70 rather than refer such 
violations to the Umted States Attorney as they now do? 
PURPOSE: Young also distinguishes mdirect contempt from 
''the general cnmmal laws'' because contempt prosecutions ''serve 
the limited purpose of vmdicatmg the authonty of the court.' ' 71 
Yet, do not VIolations of "general" laws challenge the authonty 
of the legislature? How then can one distmgmsh between general 
law prosecutiOns from limited contempt prosecutions? It seems 
farMfetched to argue that the obJect of the contemnor's offense 
IS court authority (rather than the court order she seeks to evade) 
whereas the obJect of the "general" law VIolator IS the substan-
tive law (rather than the legislative body which enacts it).72 
Considermg the Implausibility of this argument, this rationale 
seems little more than a naked statement that the JUdiciary IS 
mstitutiOnally less able to withstand noncompliance than the 
other branches of government. Even if this necessity argument 
IS true, however, it speaks only to JUdicial authonty In contempt 
actions. It does not suggest that mdirect contempt IS not a cnme. 
The notion that, m light of this purpose, contempt Is mher-
ently different from other cnmes IS troubling on another count. 
Under this formulatiOn, all laws seem fundamentally different 
from each other for they all concern different areas and serve 
different purposes. Contempt concerns JUdicial authonty JUSt as 
the Ethics m Government Act concerns executive branch corrup-
70 See R. GOLDFARB, supra note 42 at 128-61 (argumg that such a power should 
eXIst). 
71 Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2133 (emphasis added). 
71 The Bloom Court makes precisely this pomt. See supra note 48 and accompa-
nymg text. 
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tion. Yet Young certru:nly does not counsel that the executive's 
special Interest m mternal corruptiOn JUStifies plenary executive 
control of Ethics m Government Act enforcement. It therefore 
seems Incomprehensible that a law's purpose should serve as the 
mitial reference pomt for gaugmg the applicability of traditional 
cnrmnal enforcement. 
* * * * * * * * * 
The failure of source, specificity, and purpose to JUStify 
distmct treatment for contempt leaves only the "necessity" ra-
tiOnale. We shall now turn our attention to this JUStificatiOn. 
Ill. THE NECESSITY RATIONALE 
The Young Court also grounded Its opimon In necessity The 
Court warns that, without the contempt appomtment power, the 
JUdiciary would be dependent on the executive to vindicate Its 
authonty, thereby rendenng the courts "mere boards of arbitra-
tiOn whose Judgments and decrees would be only advisory ''73 
Young further supports this assumption of "quasi-executive" 
power by highlighting the passivity of the JUdicial function. 
Unlike the other ·branches of government whose JUrisdictiOn 
''would mclude the entire populatiOn,' '74 a JUdicial contempt 
authonty extends "only" over those whose obligatiOns spnng 
from an earlier court proceeding.75 Consequently, rather than 
extending the JUdiciary mto the executive sphere, the contempt 
power merely prevents the transformatiOn of the JUdicial power 
mto a ''mere mockery ''76 
Justice Scalia took Issue with this reasomng, argumg that 
the JUdicial power IS limited to "the power to decide, In accor-
dance with law, who should prevail In a case or controversy " 77 
Furthermore, clru:mmg that the separatiOn of powers presupposes 
that each branch Is somewhat dependent on other branches to 
put mto effect their JUdgments,78 Justice Scalia accuses the rna-
73 Young v. United States ex ref. Vuitton Et Fils S.A., 107 S. Ct. 2124, 2132 
(1987) (quoting Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 4I8, 450 (1911)). 
74 Jd. at 2134 n.lO. 
" Jd. 
76 Jd. at 2131 (quoting Gompers, 221 U.S. at 450). 
77 Jd. at 2142 (Scalia, J., concurrmg). 
" Jd. at 2143. 
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JOnty of validatmg a tyranmcal regime m which JUdges make 
the laws, prosecute their viOlatiOn, and sit In Judgment of their 
prosecutiOn [sic].79 
In our VIew, Justice Scalia makes the better argument. Our 
system of checks and balances presupposes Interdependence. This 
seems especially true In the case of the JUdiciary, ''the least 
dangerous branch." Consequently, unless mst1tut10nal necessity 
mandates some deviation from executive prosecutonal discretion, 
the executive should bnng forward cnminal contempt cases. A 
review of the law of congressiOnal contempt and an assessment 
of mdirect cnminal contempt's Impact on core JUdicial functiOns 
convmces us that Young's "necessity" ratiOnale IS without ment. 
This sectiOn shall detail our reasomng on this matter. 
A. Judiczal Independence and the Separation of Powers 
The dependence on one branch to carry out the will of 
another IS fundamental to the separatiOn of powers. From Pres-
Ident Jackson's Infamous response to McCulloch v Mary/ancf8° 
{"John Marshall has made his decision, let him enforce It")81 to 
Justice Jackson's astute recognitiOn m Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v Sawyer that "[w]hile Congress cannot depnve the 
President of the command of the army and navy, only Congress 
can provide him an army or navy to command"82 to the current 
controversy over the mdependent counsel, 83 It Is axiOmatic that 
each branch plays a cntical role m the other branches' effective-
ness. Congress depends on the executive to enforce the laws, 
and the JUdiciary and the executive both depend on Congress to 
support therr operations. The JUdiciary also depends on Congress 
and the executive to pass legislation and undertake enforcement 
mecharusms that will make Its decisions mearungful. 84 Even withm 
79 Id. at 2145. 
80 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
11 The phrase IS reputed. See J. AGRESTO, THE SUPREME CoURT AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEMOCRACY 90 (1984). 
12 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 644 (1952) (Jackson, 
J ., concumng). 
13 Mornson v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). 
"' School desegregation IS a pnme example. The Supreme Court's mandate m 
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was little more than a false promtse 
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the area of contempt, JUdges depend on executive officials to 
arrest and Jail conv1cted contemnors. No pnnciple of necessity 
gives Congress the power to prosecute and Jail law VIolators if 
the executive fails to do so or g~ves the executive the authonty 
to support itself when Congress fails to appropnate funds. 
Recogruzmg the sanctity of separatiOn of powers, the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly ruled that no branch may exercise 
a functiOn reserved to a coordinate branch. Executive efforts to 
exercise lawmaking functions were declared Invalid In 
Youngstown85 as were executive efforts to control the Judiciary's 
adjudicatory power In Umted States v Nixon 86 and Northern 
Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Lme Co. 87 CongressiOnal efforts 
to exercise executive/admmistrative functiOns have been rejected 
In Buckley v Valeo, 88 Immzgration and Naturalization Servzce 
v. Chadha,89 and Bowsher v Synar 90 Finally, m Umted States 
v Brown,91 the Court ruled that the Bill of Attamder Clause 
was mtended as a "safeguard agamst legislative exercise of the 
JUdicial function.' '92 All of these cases speak to the same prop-
osition, namely, ''that mdividual freedoms will best be preserved 
until Congress and the executive took steps to desegregate public schools. In fact, with 
·the advent of executive and legislative programs, more actual desegregation of southern 
schools occurred m 1965 than m the decade followmg Brown. See DeVJns & Stedman, 
New Federalism m Education: The Meanmg of the Chzcago School Desegregation Cases, 
59 NoTRE DAME L. REv 1243, 1246-51 (1984); Kirp, School Desegregation and the 
Lzmits of Legalism, 41 PUB. INTEREST 101 (Sprmg 1977); see also T. BECKER & M. 
FEELY, THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 69-76 (1973) (discussing delays m the 
enforcement of school desegregation deciSIOns). 
u Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 579 (executive may not exerc1se article I lawmakmg 
powers granted to Congress). 
86 418 U.S. 683 (I974) (executive may not exercise article III adjudicatory power 
granted to JUdiciary). 
17 Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Lme Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (executive 
appomtment of bankruptcy JUdges violates article III adjudicatory power). 
81 424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976) (per cunam) (Congress may not retam power to remove 
officials exerc1smg executive authority). 
19 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (Congress may not utilize smgle-house veto to control 
admm1strative agenc1es). 
90 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) (executive powers cannot be entrusted to offic1als who 
can be removed by Congress). 
91 381 u.s. 437 (1965). 
n Id. at 442; see United States v. Klem, 80 U.S. (13 WallJ 128 (1871) (Congress 
Improperly exerc1ses executive authority when it mterferes with agency rulemakmg). 
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through a separation of powers and division of functiOns among 
the different branches and levels of government. " 93 
In the case of the JUdiciary, the necessity of prohibitmg 
courts from assummg the responsibilities of the other branches 
becomes especially clear. In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton 
has set forth the classic statement on the limits of JUdicial power· 
The JUdiciary has no mfluence over either the sword or 
the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth 
of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It 
may truly be srud to have neither FORCE nor WILL but 
merely JUdgment; and must ultimately depend upon the rud of 
the executive arm even for the efficacy of its JUdgments.94 
Ascribmg to this VIew of the JUdiciary as ''the weakest of the 
three departments of power"95 makes life tenure for JUdges 
acceptable. The courts are given the power of JUdicial review 
completely msulated from outside mfluence precisely because 
their opimons are only as valid as they are persuasive. Indeed, 
for Hamilton, "there IS no liberty If the power of JUdgmg be 
not separated from the legislative and executive powers. " 96 
All of this IS not to say that the JUdiciary IS absolutely 
forbidden from performmg nonJudicial acts. As the Supreme 
Court has recogmzed, the separatiOn of powers does not reqmre 
"a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government 
from one another, " 97 but JUdicial encroachment mto the execu-
tive sphere must be JUStified by true "necessity " In other words, 
the rhetonc of Young-that Without the power to Imtiate mdirect 
cnmmal contempt, the JUdiciary will be a "mere mockery"-
must be close to correct. We shall now explore the veracity of 
the Young argument. 
B. Direct Versus Indirect Contempt: Towards an Understanding 
of Essential Judicza/ Functions 
The Young Court, pomtmg to a long line of precedents, held 
that the contempt power speaks both to the disruptiOn of court 
93 United States v. United States Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Michigan, 407 
u.s. 297, 317 (1972). 
9" THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522-23 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
" Id. at 465-66. 
96 Id. at 466. 
97 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 121. 
880 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [VoL. 76 
proceedings and the enforcement of court orders.98 Conse-
quently, Young VIews the distmct10n between In-court and out-
of-court contempts as pertment only to procedural matters, rather 
than mherent JUdicial authonty 99 Justice Scalia takes Issue With 
this depiction of pnor Court decisions. In his vtew, the most 
recent of these pnor precedents-Bloom v Jllinors100-"specifi-
cally rejected [earlier decisiOns'] ratiOnale that courts must have 
self-contamed power to pumsh disobedience of their Judg-
ments.'' 101 
We need not resolve whether Justice Scalia or the Young 
rnaJonty Is the better reader of precedent. In our view, Indirect 
cnminal contempts cannot be supported by a "necessity" ra-
tiOnale and therefore are violative of the separatiOn of powers 
scheme.102 
Young's necessity argument IS of two parts, namely· (1) 
without mdirect cnmmal contempt, " 'a party can make himself 
a JUdge of the validity of orders whtch have been Issued' " 103 
and (2) mtrus10n mto the other branches spheres of authority IS 
de rrnmmis because the cnminal contempt power Is Iirrnted to 
those whose legal obligat10ns result from pnor court proceed-
mgs.104 Neither of these arguments adequately supports Indirect 
cnmmal contempt. 
The first argument, necessity, appears mcorrect on at least 
two counts. The use of cnmmal sanctions to deter future viOl-
98 Young, 101 S. Ct. at 2132 (citing Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 
333 (1904); Ex Parte Robtnson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1874); Anderson v. Dunn, 
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821)). 
99 Young, 101 S. Ct. at 2132-33. 
100 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). 
101 Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2145 (Scalia, J., concurnng). 
102 See also Cohen, Self-love and the Judicwl Power to Appomt a Speczal Prose-
cutor, I6 HoFSTRA L. REv 23 (1987) (crittcizmg necessity rationale m Young). 
103 Young, 101 S. Ct. at 2I32 n.8 (citing Gompers, 221 U.S. at 450). In a May 
1988 decision, the Supreme Court clarified thts necessity holding. United States v. 
Providence Journal Co., 108 S. Ct. 1502 (1988). Upholding the Solicitor General's power 
to authonze all certioran filings by the United States, the Provzdence Journal Court 
dismtssed a writ of certioran filed by a court-appomted prosecutor. In distingmshtng 
Young, the Court clrumed that the executive's plenary authority m thts area does not 
Implicate necessity concerns. Id. at 1507-IO. Since a court-appomted prosecutor can only 
seek certiorari if her contempt prosecution has already failed, the Court reasoned that 
"the necessity that requtred the appomtment of an mdependent prosecutor has faded 
and, mdeed, ts no longer present." !d. at 1508. 
104 !d. at 2134 n.IO. 
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at10ns of court orders seems an executive functiOn. The JUdicial 
role IS the resolutiOn of cases or controversies. Consequently, It 
appears that the JUdiciary need only the authority to pumsh 
direct contempts or at most an additional coercive civil contempt 
power for out-of-court obstructions of JUdicial proceedings. The 
logic underlymg the doctrme of absolute JUdicial Immumty for 
the violation of constitutional nghts supports this reasomng. 105 
Judicial Immunity spnngs from the notion that pnncipled and 
fearless deciSionmakmg IS a prereqUisite to the effective exercise 
of the JUdicial functiOn. This concern of the JUdicial functiOn, 
however, IS with the nght to decide a case, not With the nghtness 
or wrongness of the decision. Concern over compliance With a 
court order, In our view, speaks more to the correctness of a 
decision than to the decisionmaking process and IS therefore not 
an Integral element of the JUdicial functiOn. 
The "necessity" argument has another fault. Necessity pre-
supposes that cnmmal contempt IS the only mechamsm that will 
mstill needed respect m the JUdiciary. Civil contempt, however, 
can be qmte effective.106 For example, the Umted States Catholic 
Conference was recently subject to a civil contempt penalty of 
over $100,000 per day for Its failure to comply with a discovery 
order. 107 Young neither can nor does address this Issue. 
Young's second argument, scope, IS also unsupportable. The 
contempt power Is not always lirmted to the parties before the 
court.108 Moreover, parties do not necessarily "assume the nsk" 
10s See generally Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), reh•g demed, 436 U.S. 
951 {1978); Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of JudiciO/ Immunity, 1980 
DUKE L.J. 879; Note, Liability of Judicial Offices Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 
322 (1969). 
106 While it IS of course true that the executive enforces CIVil as well as cnmmal 
law, separation of powers concerns are less acute here. Civil contempt proceedings are 
constdered a part of the ongmal cause of action whereas cnmmal contempt 1s a collateral 
proceeding "between the public and the defendant." Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range 
Co., 221 U.S. 418, 445 (1911). 
107 See Bnef for Petitioners, United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights 
Mobilization, Inc., at 8 (argumg, m part, that a court without article III power cannot 
Issue a subpoena or coerce compliance through c1vil contempt). The Supreme Court-
accepting the petitioners' argument-recently overturned this award. United States Cath-
olic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, 108 S. Ct. 2268 (1988). 
101 See, e.g., Seymour v. United States, 373 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967) (affirmmg the 
contempt conviction of a teleVIsion news photographer who took photographs m the 
hallway outside a courtroom m viOlation of a standing order). Admittedly, the obJection 
here 1s more analytical than practical because cases of thts type are not very common. 
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by coming before the court voluntarily. Because anyone can be 
sued, the "parties potentially subject toH 109 the court's contempt 
authority do, In fact, "include the entire population. " 11° For 
this very reason, Young's attempt to distmgmsh a JUdicial con-
tempt power from a congressional enforcement power IS 
stramed.111 
A host of pragmatic reasons also supports rejection of 
Young's "necessity" "nonmttusiVeness" rationale. The mdirect 
cnmmal contempt power that Young gives the JUdiciary IS far 
from harmless. From a functional perspective, the cnmmal con-
tempt power presents a very real problem of Institutional b1as.112 
Judges are more likely to perceive msults to their authonty than 
are Umted States Attorneys, and therefore are more likely to 
Imtiate proceedings In borderline cases. Indeed, the anticipated 
standards for prosecution must be lower for a JUdge than for a 
prosecutor because Young envisions cases where a judge will go 
forward after a prosecutor has declined.113 Thus, an umntended 
consequence of Young may be the establishment of a dual cnm-
mal JUStice system-one for VIolators of the "general" law en .. 
forced by the United States Attorney, the other-possibly utilizmg 
a lower threshold for actionable wrongdomg-for violators of 
court orders enforced by the JUdiciary 
109 Young, 107 s. Ct. at 2134 n.lO. 
110 /d. 
111 See supra notes 68-70 ahd accompanymg text. 
112 See generally Komesar, Back to the Future-An /hStitutional View of Makmg 
and Interpreting Constitutions, 81 Nw U.L. REv 191 (1987) (advocating a "comparative 
mstitutional" approach to separation of powers, wherem the resources, abilities, and 
biases of each branch are considered when assigrung powers and functions among the 
branches). 
113 The D.C. Circuit rrused such fundamental concerns m In re Sealed Case, 838 
F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom., Mornson v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). 
In mvalidating the special counsel law, the court suggested that a lower standard for 
prosecution eXIsted for subJects of an mdependent counsel investigation, and thus "fun-
damental frurness" problems might arise. /d. at 510. In reversmg this deciston, the 
Supreme Court did not comment on thts concern. 
Functional concerns did play a part m Morrzson, however. In defense of the special 
counsel provision, the Court argued that JUdges are "especially well qualified" to appomt 
prosecutors. Morrzson, 108 S. Ct. at 2611 n.13 (1988). This proposition ts troublesome. 
Although the Court was merely contrasting the JUdiciary's qualifications m appomting 
legal counsel with the qualifications of non-legal offictals, the Court was more accurate 
m its 1985 recognition that enforcement decistons are ''peculiarly within [the) expertise" 
of the executive. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). 
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As the ''inJured party,'' moreover, a JUdge IS precisely the 
worst person to make the decision to prosecute, because she IS 
an mterested participant. Indeed, m Bloom v, Illinors, the Court 
recogmzed the Hpotential for abu&e"H4 m summary contempt 
because "[m]en who make their way to the bench sometimes 
exhibit vanity, Irascibility, narrowness, arrogClllce, and other 
weaknesses to which human flesh IS heir. " 115 
These dangers are heightened under the eXIstmg f~deral rules, 
because In cnmmal contempt cases not mvolvmg '~disrespect to 
or criticism of a JUdge," the presiding Judge makes the com-
plamt, decides whether to prosecute, appomts the prosecutor, 
presides over the tnal, and, upon conviction, sentences the de-
fendant.116 Justrce Scalia therefore rrused no Idle concern when 
he complruned m Young of "judges' [src] m effect making the 
laws, prosecutmg their violation, and s1ttmg m JUdgm~nt of those 
prosecutions. "117 
Aside from the Inherent btas of the courts, executive offi-
Cials' mnate expenence with prosecutonal discretion makes as-
signment of thts duty to article II officials desrrable from a 
functiOnal perspective. Enforcement deciSions reqwre the weigh .. 
mg of a large number of factors, mcluding the sufficiency of 
evidence, the availability of alternatives, the allocatiOn of scarce 
resources, and others. The consideratiOn of these factors by the 
executive IS "peculiarly withm Its expertise," and thus the ex-
ecutive ''is far better eqmpped than the courts to deal with the 
many variables Involved. " 118 
On the most practical level, the appOintment power IS simply 
not necessary to protect the JUdiciary from Impotence. Courts 
In civil law countnes do not enJOY such a power, but they 
nonetheless mruntrun their efficacy 119 The Supreme Court has 
n• Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968). 
115 ld. at 202, n.4 (quoting Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 12 (1952)). 
116 Rule 42(b) provides for disqualification of the "inJured" JUdge from presiding 
at the contempt tnal only when the "contempt charged mvolves disrespect to or criticism 
of a JUdge. " Federal courts have held that the same JUdge whose order was disobeyed 
can sentence the contemnor. United States v. Prugh, 479 F.2d 611 (8th Cir. 1973); 
United States v. Conole, 365 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. demed, 385 U.S. 1025 (1967). 
But see United States v. Combs, 390 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1968). 
117 Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2145 (Scalia, J., concurrmg). 
111 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831-32. 
119 R. GoLDFARB, supra note 42, at 22. 
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used Its contempt power only once, 120 and yet It IS by no means 
a "mere board of arbitratiOn. " 121 
Courts can depend on the executive to enforce contempt 
JUdgments, JUSt as they already depend on the executive to 
enforce liens and Impnson mdividuals whom the courts adjudi-
cated as cnmmals. As noted earlier, even m the contempt con-
text, courts trust the executive to arrest and pumsh those Judged 
to be m contempt.122 
Prosecutors simply will not refuse JUdges' requests to pros-
ecute contemners. A study of federal prosecutors on this subJect 
showed that they umformly Imtiate proceedings agrunst recalci-
trant witnesses.123 One federal distnct has adopted a policy of 
mitiatmg cnmmal contempts by mdictment. Prosecutors there 
have not refused JUdges' requests to seek contempt Indictments. 
The Chief Judge considered such a refusal unlikely m light of 
the close workmg relatiOnship between the court and the prose-
cutors.124 Indeed, given attorneys' natural eagerness to keep 
themselves m the Judge's good graces, any refusal of a valid 
request seems unlikely, and refusals on a level sufficient to 
undermme respect for the JUdiciary seem wildly Improbable. 
The maJOrity m Young acknowledged this: 
In practice, courts can reasonably expect that the public pros-
ecutor will accept the responsibility for prosecutiOn. Indeed, 
the Umted States Attorney's Manual § 9-39 -318 (1984) ex-
pressly provides: ''In the great maJOrity of cases the dedication 
of the executive branch to the preservation of respect for 
JUdicial authority makes the acceptance by the U.S. Attorney 
of the court's request to prosecute a mere formality " 12S 
The ma]onty used the likelihood of executive compliance to 
rnimffilze the effect of Its decision. Analytically, that likelihood 
undercuts the ratiOnale for the deciSion. There IS simply no 
reason to disrupt the separation of powers when the executive IS 
likely to pursue Indirect contempt violatiOns. 
120 United States v. Sh1pp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906). 
121 Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2132 (quoting Gompers, 221 U.S. at 450). 
122 Id. at 2143 (Scalia, J., concurnng). 
123 Kuhns, supra note 58, at 512-13 & n.134. 
12A Id. at 503 n.98. 
125 Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2134. 
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These pragmatic concerns, combined With the unpersuasive-
ness of Young's "necessity" and "scope" rationales, convmce 
us that mdirect cnmmal contempt Is not essential to the Integnty 
of the JUdicial system. Consequently, this deviation from sepa-
ratiOn of powers IS unsupportable. 
C. Lessons from Other Places 
1. Contempt of Congress 
Contempt of Congress' actwns126 buttress our conclusion that 
mdirect contempt prosecutions are not an essential JUdicial at-
tribute. In fact, while "necessity" does not JUStify mherent 
congressiOnal power to pumsh cnrmnal contempt, the "neces-
sity'' argument here IS much stronger than the necessity argu-
ment accepted by Young for mdirect cnrmnal contempt. 
Congress has no mherent power to pumsh for cnm1nal con-
tempt. 127 In contrast to Bntam, where legislative contempt IS 
Immune from Judicial review, 128 Congress has mherent power 
only to "coerce" by civil contempt. This power Is mherent 
because without It Congress could not effectively undertake Its 
legislative rmssion but mstead would be left "exposed to every 
mdigmty and InterruptiOn, that rudeness, capnce, or even con-
spuacy, may mediate agamst it."129 Dissatisfied with the narrow 
scope of Its mherent power, Congress enacted legislatiOn m 1857 
providing for cnmmal contempt.130 In In re Chapman, 131 the 
Court validated this proviSion as "an act necessary and proper 
for carrymg mto execution the powers vested m Congress and 
126 See generally United States v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670, 676-78 (D.C. Cir . 1971), cert. 
demed, 403 U.S. 932 (1971); L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS 
AND THE PRESIDENT 184-220 (1985); Moreland, Congresswnal Investigations and Pnvate 
Persons, 40 S. CAL. L. REv 189 (1967). 
127 The Constitution does explicitly vest Congress with a number of JUdicial powers, 
mcluding the power to purush members. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 
(1880). 
111 L. FISHER, supra note 126, at 187. 
129 Anderson, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 228. 
no Act of January 24, 1857, ch. 19, 11 Stat. 155 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. 
§ 192 (1982)). 
Ill 166 u.s. 661 (1897). 
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In each House thereof."132 Critical to tlus holding was the Court's 
recogmt10n that the obJect of contempt prosecutions was the 
"disclosure of evidence" essential to Congress' legislative func-
tiOn.I33 Congress' contempt power thus ruds Its mvestigative func-
tion, which Is central to Its constitutional role. 
Cnmmal contempt of Congress IS different from mdirect 
cnmmal contempt m two cntlcal respects. First, congressional 
contempt IS undertaken pursuant to a "general" law because 
the legislature's Inherent contempt power extends only to coer-
cion, not pumshment. Unlike mdirect cnmmal contempt, con-
tempt of Congress reenforces the maxim that the legislature 
specifies that which IS cnmmal. Second, congressiOnal contempt 
speaks only to conduct that directly Impedes the legislative func-
tiOn. Unlike Indirect cnmmal contempt, this requirement ensures 
that the contempt mechamsm IS narrowly tailored to essential 
legislative functtons. 
Procedures governmg the filing of a congressiOnal contempt 
action are also mstructive. Under 2 U .S.C. sectiOn 194, the 
House Speaker or Senate Prestdent shall certtfy facts constituting 
a contempt of Congress "to the appropnate U.S. attorney, 
whose duty 1t shall be to bnng the matter before the grand JUry 
for Its act10n."134 Because "shall" does not necessarily mean 
"must, " 135 tt Is possible that the statute preserves prosecutonal 
discretion. 136 In fact, the Reagan admimstrat10n adopted this 
view In Its handling of contempt of Congress charges agrunst 
EPA AdmiiDstrator Anne Gorsuch.137 
Even If sectiOn 194 mandates executive actiOn, 138 the mtrus10n 
on executive prerogatives may be m1mmal m practice. The pros-
132 /d. at 671. 
m Jd. (quoting Chapman v. United States, 5 App. D.C. 122, 130-31 (D.C. Cir. 
1895)). 
134 2 U.S.C. § 194 (1982) (emphasis added). 
m See generally Sutton, Use of "Shall" m Statutes, 4 JoHN MARsHALL L.Q. 204 
(1938). 
136 But cj. Ex parte Frankfeld, 32 F Supp. 915, 916 (D.D.C. 1940) (U.S. Attorney 
has no discretion with contempts of Congress but must -submit the facts to the grand 
JUry). 
" 
137 See I29 Cong. Rec. H6441-47 (1983); L. FISHER, supra note 126, at 211-12. 
138 In our view, because the executive retams complete discretion over the manner -
m which it should bnng a contempt of Congress case, any obligation to present the case 
before the grand JUry 1s no more than a "mmtstenal" task. 
1987-88] CONTEMPT PROSECUTORS 887 
ecutor would still retrun discretion to handle the case In a manner 
she deemed appropnate.I39 This ''safety valve'' Is unavailable In 
Young, where executive prosecutonal discretiOn may be turned 
over to a JUdicial appomtee.I40 Moreover, legislative trutiation 
may well be consistent with the separation of powers. Because 
the cnmmal contempt power appears a necessary corollary to 
the mvestigative functioni4I and because the executive retruns 
discretion m handling the case, neither of the two pnncipal 
mfirmities of Young prosecutiOns are present. In addition, the 
failure of· the executive to mitiate contempt proceedings IS a 
more realistic concern wrth congressional contempt than with 
the violation of court orders because resistance to congressional 
subpoenas may come from admimstration officials.I42 
The analogy between congressional contempt and directed 
cnmmal contempt cuts agrunst the Young decisiOn. Congres-
siOnal contempt may well preserve prosecufonal discretiOn. Con-
gressiOnal contempt, moreover, IS a narrowly tailored means of 
protecting Congress' Investigative function. 
2. Independent Counsel 
Another, more obviOus analogy IS the Ethics m Government 
Act provisions allowmg for the court appomtment of mdepend-
ent counsels by "Special DivisiOn" panels.143 While senous sep-
139 R. GOLDFARB, supra note 42, at 42. 
140 In fact, court control over both the appomtment of the prosecutor and the 
sentencmg of the contemnor make it likely that the court-appomted prosecutor will do 
little else than help put mto effect the appomting court's preference. 
141 This, of course, IS the critical question. On the one hand, cnmmal contempt of 
Congress enhances legislative Investigations by deternng noncompliance. On the other 
hand, as with JUdicial contempt, a-long line of decisions recogruzes its equivalence to 
ordinary cnme for procedural purposes. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 755 
(1962); Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 471 (1961); Flaxer v. United States, 358 
U.S. 147, 151 (1958); Sacher, 356 U.S. at 577; Watkms v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 
208 (1957); Sinclrur v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 291-92 (1929). Consequently, except 
for m-the-chambers disruption of proceedings, congressional contempt IS analytically 
and functionally mdistingmshable from ordinary cnme; as a result, any reservation of 
prosecutonal discretion by Congress IS an Impermissible mtrus10n mto executive prero-
gatives and an unwarranted arrogation of power, plagued by the same potential for 
mstitutional bias as the JUdictary's discretion to prosecute msults to its own authority. 
141 See, e.g., United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 
1983); L. FISHER, supra note 126, at 211-13. 
141 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 49, 591 et seq. (Supp. 1988). 
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arat10n of powers concerns are rrused by tlus practice, 144 problems 
presented by court-appomted special prosecutors are simply not 
of the same magmtude as Young-approved mdirect cnmmal 
contempt. 
Ethics Act procedures are less Intrusive on prosecutonal 
discretion than the JUdicial appOintment power approved m 
Young. The Act gives the Attorney General a role In the decision 
whether to prosecute. He decides Imtlally whether to conduct a 
prelimmary InvestigatiOn. 145 After any such mvest1gat10n, he de-
cides whether an mdependent counsel IS needed at all. 146 Neither 
of these decisions Is JUdicially reviewable.147 Thus, If the execu-
tive feels that prosecution Is unwarranted or detnmental, It can 
block prosecutiOn-a prerogative unavailable to the executive In 
Young. Further, the appomtments have express statutory au-
thonzatiOn, sometlung not enJoyed by contempt appomtments.148 
The Attorney General also defines the scope of the mvesti-
gation. As the Court construed the Act m Mornson, the Special 
Division may not expand thts scope.149 Any post-appomtment 
duties It possesses, held the Court, are merely "m1mstenal." 150 
The Attorney General, finally, Is empowered to remove the 
special counsel. Although removal must be for "good cause" 151 
144 See Rabkm and Devms, supra note 1 at 223-24. This essay will not assess the 
correctness of MorriSon. In our VIew, whether or not Mornson was nghtly dectded, 
mdirect cnmmal contempt 1s both an Improper self-aggrandizement of JUdicial power 
and an unJustifiable limit on executive prosecutonal discretion. 
14
s The Attorney General IS not compelled to act unless he determmes that the 
mformation presented to h1m IS "sufficient to constitute grounds to mvestigate." 28 
U.S.C.A. at § 591(a) (Supp. 1988). 
146 Id. at § 592(b)(l). 
147 See Banzhaf v. Srruth, 737 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Nathan v. Smith, 737 
F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Accord Mornson v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2621 (1988) 
("the Spectal Division has no power to appomt an mdependent counsel sua sponte; It 
may only do so upon the specific request of the Attorney General, and the courts are 
specifically prevented from revtewmg the Attorney General's deciSion not to seek ap-
pomtment). 
148 Mornson emphasized this statutory attribute. Noting that the appomtments 
clause authonzes Congress to vest appomtment of "infenor officers" "in the Courts of 
Law," the Court effectively concluded that appomtments clause concerns were satisfied. 
Momson , 108 S. Ct. at 2608-11. 
"
9 !d. at 2613 nn. 17 & 18. 
1so Id. at 2613-14. Although the Special DivlSlon IS authonzed to termmate the 
special counsel's office when her mvestigation JS clearly over, the Court found this 
authority msignificant. Id. 
1s1 28 U.S.C.A. at§ 596(a)(1) (Supp. 1988). The special counsel can also be removed 
for any "condition that substantially Impairs the performance of [her] duties." ld. 
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(thereby ensunng that the specml counsel possesses ''a degree of 
mdependent discret10n" 152 to exercise her powers), this removal 
power guards agrunst court-sponsored prosecutions based either 
m malice or vmdictlveness. 
The necessity rationale that supports the Ethics Act, more-
over, IS much weightier than that advanced m Young. The 
Watergate expenence IS only the most dramatic example of 
possible abuse when executive officers are charged with policmg 
themselves. 153 In contrast, conflict-of-mterest considerations work 
for the opposite result In Young. A JUdge who feels slighted 
may first select a champiOn to vmdicate his authonty and then 
Sit In Judgment over the person who offered the slight. Mentless 
prosecutions, overzealous executiOn, and disproportiOnate sen-
tences are a likely consequence of such a scheme. 
Most significant, JUdicial aggrandizement concerns which 
plague mdirect cnffilnal contempt are less significant here. 154 The 
Ethics Act places severe limits on the Special Division. The 
Attorney General first determmes the need for an mdependent 
counsel and then defines the scope of her mvesttgat10n. 155 Whether 
and how the mdependent counsel bnngs forward her case are 
also nonreviewable decisions. 156 Finally, Division members are 
m 108 S. Ct. at 2608. 
m An 1dentical argument can be made With respect to contempt orders directed 
agamst the executive. If Justice Department officials have sole authonty over the pros-
ecution of such digressions, real conflict-of-mterest problems are present. Consequently, 
the necessity JUStification for mdirect cnmmal contempt IS much stronger m such cases. 
At the same time, the D.C. Circuit argued that there IS a Significant mstitutional 
b1as withm the mdependent counsel's office: "The need to JUStify an office dedicated 
solely to one goal," and "the success of the office Itself, m the public's eyes," are 
"umque mcenuves" to go forward and seek mdictments where they may not otherw1se 
be appropnate. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 509-10 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev•d sub 
nom., Mornson v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). Mornson, however, found that Eth1cs 
Act procedures are designed to avo1d a conflict of mterests. The Court concluded that, 
smce the Spec1al DivlSlon has no power to rev1ew actions taken by either the Attorney 
General or mdependent counsel, its actions will not be biased. Mornson, 108 S. Ct. at 
2615. The Court also found Significant the Act's prohibition agrunst Division member 
participation m mdependent counsel prosecutions. Id. 
•s. Act procedures do allow for the stnppmg of power from the executive, however. 
MorriSon found this depletion too msignificant to disrupt core executive functions. We 
do not endorse th1s conclusiOn. 
1
'' See supra notes 145-52 and accompanymg text. 
u6 See supra note 153. 
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prohibited from partictpatmg In special counsel prosecutions.157 
Each of these limitations stands In stark contrast to the 
procedures approved m Young. While the special counsel pro-
VISion does take responsibilities from the executive, It does not 
give those responsibilities to another branch. In mdirect cnmmal 
contempt actiOns, on the other hand, rmtlatlon, supervision, and 
sentencmg are all controlled by the offended JUnst. 
Neither the mdependent counsel provisions of the Ethics Act 
or the Supreme Court's recent validatiOn of this practice reaf-
firms Young. The appOintment of mdependent counsels mfnnges 
on executive prerogatives less, Increases only slightly the power 
of article III courts, poses fewer threats of InJUStice m Individual 
cases, and rests on a more compelling rationale than the ap-
pomtment of pnvate contempt prosecutiOns. 
CONCLUSION 
Young hmges on two false premises. Clrummg that cnmmal 
contempt IS a noncnme subject to cnminal penalty, the Court 
ducks the Issue of traditional prosecutonal discretion. The source, 
scope, and purpose of cnmmal contempt, however, refute this 
suggestiOn. Young views the enforcement of court orders as a 
JUdicial functiOn, as opposed to an executive one. But mdirect 
cnmmal contempt does not speak to essential JUdicial functions, 
nor IS It a nonobtrusive means to preserve JUdicial authority 
Instead, It Is an open Invitation to the JUdiciary to extend its 
authonty mto the legislative sphere whenever It feels a litigant 
has been unduly disrespectful. 
At a time m the Court's history when great emphasis IS 
placed on the need for the executive and Congress to stay within 
their respective spheres of authonty, Young Is a remarkable, 
unjustifiable, and unnecessary aggrandizement of JUdicial power. 
1s7 See zd. 
